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Federal Income Tax Treatment of Payments Pursuant
to § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934
For the past eight years the Tax Court has feuded with various
United States courts of appeals over the tax deductibility of payments
in satisfaction of alleged liability under § 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.1 The Tax Court has consistently held that pay-
ments made pursuant to § 16(b) are ordinary and necessary business
expenses deductible under § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19542
The Commissioner has appealed each of these decisions, and the vari-
ous courts of appeals have consistently found that the § 16(b) payments
are not deductible under § 162 of the Code, but are capital losses
The significance of this judicial confrontation for the taxpayer is that
the tax benefit is potentially much greater if § 16(b) payments are
characterized as fully deductible ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses rather than capital losses with limited deductibility. This Note
will examine the alternative approaches to the problem of the tax
treatment of § 16(b) payments.
I. BACKGROUND
Section 16(b) is designed to discourage the unfair use of informa-
tion that may be obtained by an officer, director, or beneficial owner
1. 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) (1970):
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such, beneficial owner, direc-
tor, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover
such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in
behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days
after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter, but no such
suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized.
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial
owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and pur-
chase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commis-
sion by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of
this subsection.
2. I.R.C. § 162(a) provides in pertinent part: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business . . . ." This deduction will hereinafter be referred to as the "busi-
ness expense deduction."
3. I.R.C. § 165().
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of more than ten percent of the stock of a corporation. It provides, ir
part, that any profit realized by such an "insider" from any purchasc
and sale or any sale and purchase of any equity security of the corpora.
tion within a period of less than six months is recoverable by the
corporation. In 1951 the Tax Court initially tangled with the problerr
of characterizing a § 16(b) liability payment in Davis v. Commissioner.'
In that case the Tax Court reasoned that the obligation imposed b3
§ 16(b) was penal in nature and thus the deduction should be disal.
lowed; otherwise the deduction would lessen the financial sanction anc
defeat the purpose of the securities statutes. This rationale was con.
sistent with the Internal Revenue Service's position that deduction-
for payments of fines and penalties should be disallowed as contrar
to defined public policy.5 The Commissioner later acquiesced in thl
Davis holding.6
Five years later the Tax Court reached a different result in Mark.,
v. Commissioner.7 The taxpayer's partnership in Marks dealt in share-
of stock of a corporation in which taxpayer was both director an(
shareholder. Later, taxpayer became suspicious of a § 16(b) violatioi
and, in order to avoid injury to his business reputation and costl:
litigation, he paid the full amount of his possible liability to the corpora
tion. No determination of liability was ever made by the Securitie
Exchange Commission. Faced with these facts, the court was per
suaded that public policy would not be frustrated by allowing Mark
a deduction for the amount of the payment pursuant to § 23(a) of th,
Internal Revenue Code of 1939.8 In turn, the Internal Revenue Servic
agreed, stating that § 16(b) liability is not a penalty, but merely
means to return the benefit derived from the stock dealings to th
issuing corporation. Thus, the public policy of the securities statut
would not be hindered by allowing a deduction for the amount returne,
to the corporation. 9
Once it was established that a deduction would be allowed, th
question became which deduction was to be allowed-a business ex
pense deduction or the more limited capital loss deduction.' 0 Th
Revenue Ruling following Marks addressed the issue only briefly. I
indicated that the loss was to be characterized as ordinary or capit,-
depending upon the characterization of the stock dealings giving ris
to the § 16(b) payments."
4. 17 T.C. 549 (1951).
5. Ct. D. 1819, 1958-1 C.B. 502.
6. I.T. 4069. 1952-1 C.B. 28.
7. 27 T.C. 464 (1956).
8. Current version at I.R.C. § 162(a).
9. Rev. Rul. 61-115, 1961-1 C.B. 46.
10. In Marks, taxpayer was a securities dealer and the gain from his stock dealings W,
ordinary income. Thus, the nature of the deduction was not in question.
!1. Rev. Rut. 61-115, 1961-1 C.B. 46.
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Ii. RECENT CASES
A. Mitchell v. Commissioner
The Tax Court's next encounter with the issue of the characteriza-
tion of a § 16(b) payment came in Mitchell v. Commissioner.12  Tax-
payer in that case was a vice president in charge of styling for General
Motors. Unaware of § 16(b), he apparently violated the provision
when in October 1962 he sold 2,736 shares of GM common stock and
within the prohibited six month period purchased 2,130 shares of GM
stock under an employee stock option. Although no determination of
liability was ever made and despite one possible defense,13 Mitchell
was advised by legal counsel to pay his potential liability to GM. Ac-
cordingly, he paid GM $17,939.29 but maintained that he had not
violated § 16(b). Had Mitchell refused to pay this alleged liability,
GM would have been required to report the alleged violation in its
annual proxy statement, 14 which was circulated to over one million
stockholders. Moreover, GM or one of its stockholders would almost
certainly have instituted a suit against taxpayer.
Mitchell claimed a business expense deduction for the payment
to GM. The Commissioner disallowed the more favorable business
expense deduction and characterized the payment as a long-term
capital loss. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was in the business
of being a corporate officer, that the payment was made to avoid
expensive litigation and injury to his business reputation, and thus that
he had properly claimed an ordinary business deduction. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, 5 finding the business pur-
pose for the payment irrelevant because of the precedent of Arrowsmith
v. Commissioner'6 and United States v. Skelly Oil Co.
17
In Arrowsmith the taxpayer had received payments in 1937-1940
pursuant to liquidation of a jointly owned corporation, and had re-
ported this income as a capital gain. In 1944 a judgment against the
corporation was satisfied by the taxpayer as transferee of the colrpora-
tion. Taxpayer claimed ordinary business deductions on his income
tax return for this expenditure. The Commissioner argued that the
payment was a part of the original liquidation and should therefore be
treated as a capital loss.' s
12. 52 T.C. 170 (1969). rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970). cert. dealed. 401 U.S. 909
(1971).
13. 428 F.2d at 261. Mitchell felt that he was not an -ofliccr within tile meaning or
§ 240.3b-2 of the General Rules and Regulations. Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 17 C..R.
§ 240.3b-2 (1976).
14. General Rules and Regulations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 17 C.F.R.
§ 2 40-14a-101. Item 7e, Instruction (4) (1976).
15. Mitchell v. Commissioner. 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970).
16. 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
17. 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
18. 344 U.S. at 8.
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The Supreme Court reasoned in Arrowsmith that if the satisfac-
tion of the judgment had occurred during the liquidation proceedings
instead of after the liquidation, the payment would be properly classi-
fied as a capital loss rather than a business loss, and the fact that the
payment was made after liquidation did not transform the capital
loss into a business expense. 9 The Court stated that this reasoning
did not violate the annual accounting principle, which divides each
year into a separate taxable unit. Rather, the Court said, it was not
attempting to reopen the prior taxable years, but was merely examining
these prior taxable years to characterize a transaction that had occurred
in the latter taxable year.2
A majority of the Tax Court had found the facts in Mitchell dis-
tinguishable from Arrowsmith and its progeny.21 According to the Tax
Court, the sale of GM stock that produced a long-term capital gain
and the purchase that allegedly created a § 16(b) liability were separate
and distinct transactions, while the receipt of the liquidation proceeds
and payment of the judgment by the transferee of the corporation in
Arrowsmith were integrally connected. The Tax Court came to this
conclusion by reasoning that while the sale of securities had tax conse-
quences because it completed a capital gain transaction, the follow-up
purchase had only securities law significance in that it created a pos-
sible liability to GM. The Tax Court considered it noteworthy thai
actual profit or loss from the sale-purchase occurrence might in some
transactions differ in amount from the "§ 16(b) profit" as calculated
pursuant to the securities regulations.22 For example, an insider mighl
buy stock at twenty dollars and one year later sell the same stock al
ten dollars, incurring a loss. But if within the statutory period of sib
months the insider purchases other stock of the same corporation al
five dollars, he has a § 16(b) profit of five dollars. Further separatin
the payment from the stock transaction, the Tax Court found thai
Mitchell's payment was not made in concession of liability, but to avoic
injury to his business reputation.
Judge Drennen, joined by Judge Tietjens in a concurring opinior
in Mitchell, cautioned against dismissing Arrowsmith so summarily anc
suggested that if it were not for the ultimate determination that tht
payment was for business reasons, Arrowsmith might require the pay
ment to be treated as a capital loss deduction. Judge Drennen als(
suggested a third possible treatment for the payment which was no
19. Id.
20. Id. at 8-9.
21. For cases that have followed Arrowsmith, see Rees Blow Pipe Mfg. Co.. 41 T.C. 59
(1964), aff'd, 342 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1965); Estate of Shannonhouse, 21 T.C. 422 (1953); Alvin E
Lowe, 44 T.C. 363 (1953).
22. See generally L. Loss, ScutrmEs REGULATION 1062-64 (2d ed. 1961).
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urged by either party: that the amount of the payment be considered
as additional cost of the newly purchased stock.
According to the court of appeals, the reason for the Tax Court's
reluctance to apply Arrowsmith was that the recent case of United
States v. Skelly Oil Co.2 1 was not brought to its attention. The court
of appeals explained: "From our study of Skelly Oil this Court is
convinced that if the Tax Court had considered Skelly Oil it would
have applied the Arrowsmith doctrine in the present case and held
that the amount paid by the taxpayer to GM must be treated as a
capital loss deduction."24
In Skelly Oil the defendant was an Oklahoma producer of natural
gas. Prior to 1938, taxpayer had adjusted its prices in compliance with
a minimum price order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission.
After that minimum price order was overturned by the Supreme Court
in 1958,25 the defendant was forced to settle with a number of its
customers for overcharges. Taxpayer claimed ordinary business de-
ductions for the full amount of these refunds, totaling S505,536.54.
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction for the full amount of
refunds because originally the overcharge income of $505,536.54 was
subject to an oil depletion allowance of 27.5%, which resulted in taxa-
tion on only $366,513.99, or 72.5% of this income. The Commissioner
argued that taxpayer should not be allowed a $505,536.54 deduction
for a refund to customers of only $366,513.99 of taxable income.
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the taxpayer should not
be allowed "the practical equivalent of double deduction."26 To hold
otherwise, the Court added, would allow the corporation a deduction
for refunds to customers that were not taxed when received.27 Sig-
nificantly, the majority found this reasoning parallel with that of
Arrowsmith: "The rationale for the Arrowsmith rule is easy to see; if
money was taxed at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer
would be accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally
deductible from receipts taxable at the higher rate applicable to ordi-
nary income."28  Also, as in Arrowsmith, the majority defended its
decision as not violative of the annual accounting concept because
prior tax years were not reopened, but simply examined to determine
the nature of later deductions.29
23. 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
24. 428 F.2d at 262.
25. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Corporation Comm'n. 355 U.S. 425 (1958).
26. 394 U.S. at 684 (citing Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernande?. 292 U.S. 62. 68 (1934)),
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B. Anderson v. Commissioner
The Tax Court proved the Sixth Circuit's prediction wrong with
its decision in Anderson v. Commissioner.30  Faced with facts almost
identical to those in Mitchell, the Tax Court allowed Anderson, a vice
president of Zenith Corporation, a business expense deduction for
payment of an alleged § 16(b) liability, instead of limiting him to a
capital loss deduction as urged by the Commissioner. The court came
to this holding despite Skelly Oil, again deciding that the sale of stock
giving rise to a capital gain and the subsequent purchase giving rise to
§ 16(b) liability were not sufficiently related to satisfy the "integral rela-
tionship" test of Arrowsmith and its progeny.3'
In addition, the Tax Court argued that the taxpayer received his
gain from the sale in the capacity of a stockholder, but was allegedly
liable under § 16(b) for the subsequent purchase as an insider. This
distinguished Arrowsmith, in which the corporate liquidation pro-
duced a capital gain for the taxpayer in his role as a stockholder, and
his subsequent payment, satisfying a judgment against the corporation,
was also made in the capacity of a stockholder. Similarly, the Tax
Court considered the taxpayer in Skelly Oil as having both earned the
income and refunded the overcharges in the capacity of a supplier of
gas. Thus, in Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil respectively, the tax gains and
losses were incurred in identical capacities, while in Anderson the gain
was achieved as a stockholder and the loss was incurred because of
taxpayer's status as an officer of Zenith. Acknowledging that Skelly
Oil forbade unfair tax windfalls and "the practical equivalent of double
deduction,"32 the Tax Court contended that Skelly Oil applied only in
the narrow context of a taxpayer receiving and surrendering money in
the same capacity.
Accordingly, the Tax Court held that while taxpayer believed that
he had not violated securities law, he reasonably foresaw that his fail-
ure to comply with Zenith's demands for payment would jeopardize his
business reputation and position. Thus, his claim of a business ex-
pense deduction under § 162(a) of the Code was proper.
Judge Dawson of the Tax Court, joined by Judge Quealy, dis-
sented in Anderson. They disagreed with the majority's finding that
the payment of the alleged § 16(b) liability was not integrally related
to the original stock sale. Nor were the dissenters impressed by their
colleagues' analysis of the different capacities of the taxpayer in Ander-
son. They concluded that Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil were applicable.
The dissenters further criticized the majority for leaving unresolved
30. 56 T.C. 1370, rev'd. 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973).
31. See cases cited note 21 supra.
32. 394 U.S. at 684 (citing Charles feld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 68 (1934)).
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the question of treatment of two other classes of "insiders," 33 empha-
sizing the obvious inequity of allowing a bu~iness expense deduction
to an officer-insider for the protection of his career, while granting the
limited capital loss deduction to a director or ten-percent stockholder-
insider because in those capacities they have no "trade or business"
34
reputation to protect.
The Commissioner appealed the decision of the Tax Court in
Anderson to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.3  The
court of appeals disagreed with the Tax Court's determination that the
sale of stock resulting in capital gain for the taxpayer was not directly
tied to the § 16(b) payment to Zenith. As the majority opinion ex-
pressed it: "Bifurcating the sale and payment smacks of artificiality."
36
The court of appeals supported this view by explaining that the amount
of § 16(b) liability to the corporation is determined by subtracting the
purchase price from the sales price." The court also noted that in
some cases interest, calculated from the sales date, could be demanded
of a § 16(b) violator.3
The court of appeals concluded that because the sale resulting in
a capital gain and the payment of the alleged liability were integrally
connected, the Arrowsmith doctrine was applicable. Thus, the deduc-
tion for the payment should have been limited to a capital loss be-
cause the gain, to which the payment was so closely tied, was taxed as
a capital gain. The court made little mention of the Skelly Oil in-
terpretation of Arrowsmith, saying only that Arrowsmith was relevant
to Anderson with or without the "double deduction" interpretation of
Skelly Oil.
The court of appeals also attacked the Tax Court's distinguishing
Arrowsmith from Anderson on the basis of the capacities of the tax-
payer. The court substituted its own capacity analysis, reasoning that
the taxpayer had sold the stock as an insider and payment was de-
manded of him in the identical capacity of an insider.
Perhaps the strongest argument advanced by the court was based
upon the purpose and operation of § 16(b). The majority explained
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
34. I.R.C. § 162(a). See Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941). But cf. Cum-
mings v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 91, affd on rehearing, 61 T.C. 1 (1973), rev'd, 506 F.2d 449
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975) (the Tax Court allowed a business expense de-
duction to a director).
35. Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973).
36. Id. at 1307.
37. Normally, the § 16(b) liability is calculated by subtracting the purchase price from the
sales price. However, when the purchase is made pursuant to an option acquired more than
six months prior to exercise, the § 16(b) liability is calculated by subtracting the lowest market
price of any security of the same class within six months before or after the date of the sale from
the sales price. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(a) and (b). See,. e.g., Kornfeld v. Eaton, 327 F.2d 263,
265 (2d Cir. 1964) (purchase made pursuant to an option acquired more than six months prior
to its exercise).
38. See, e.g., B. T. Babbit, Inc. v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1964).
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that if an insider-officer engaged in short-swing trading in obvious vio-
lation of § 16(b), realizing a capital gain, and then was allowed a busi-
ness deduction for the full payment in satisfaction of the securities
law violation, the effectiveness of § 16(b) would evaporate. In Ander-
son, if the taxpayer was allowed a full business expense deduction,
he would enjoy a tax benefit of $21,897.64 more than if he was limited
to a capital loss deduction. Essentially, the court of appeals criti-
cized the Tax Court approach because the taxpayer could, by entering
a short-swing securities transaction and taking advantage of infor-
mation available to him as an insider in the corporation, end up with
a "profit" 39 at the expense of the Treasury. In effect the Government
would subsidize the § 16(b) violator in the amount of the deduction.
In a dissent in Anderson0 Judge Campbell recognized the major
thrust of the majority's opinion to be that it was unfair to allow an ap-
parent violator of § 16(b) to lessen the financial sanction of that section
at the expense of the federal government. But he countered that this
effect was irrelevant and that the judiciary was not responsible for in-
suring fairness and symmetry between the Code and other statutes.
4 1
For Judge Campbell the logic was simple: § 162 allows deductions for
business expenses and the taxpayer made the payments to Zenith for
business purposes. Thus, he agreed with the holding of the Tax Court
allowing taxpayer an ordinary business deduction rather than a capital
loss deduction.
C. Cummings v. Commissioner
The third confrontation between the Tax Court and the courts of
appeals over the deductibility of § 16(b) liability payments was Cum-
mings v. Commissioner.42  Taxpayer in this ca.e was a director for
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) who made a sale and purchase of
39. "Profit" here means tax profit in the sense that the taxpayer is taxed at the lower eapi-
tal rate upon receiving his gain, but is allowed a full deduction for disgorgement of part of that
gain. It cannot be said that the taxpayer profits, in the ordinary sense of the word, from his
§ 16(b) transaction because he must return the difference between the sale price and the repur-
chase price to the corporation. A taxpayer faced with the choice of violating § 16(b) by making
a transaction within six months of a prior transaction or avoiding § 16(b) by waiting for the six
months to expire before making a subsequent transaction should always choose to avoid
§ 16(b). The wise taxpayer would escape the statutory requirement of returning the § 16(h)
profits to the corporation. Although the unwise taxpayer would obtain a deduction, he has
lost a profit which he would otherwise enjoy if he had avoided § 16(b) by waiting, The un-
wise taxpayer's deduction, even if allowed as a full business expene deduction, could not equal
the benefit of the wise taxpayer's profit unless his tax rate was on- hundred percent or greater.
The unwise taxpayer's deduction will soften his loss, but it will not eliminate it. Thus, a tax-
payer would not knowingly violate § 16(b) to obtain this tax trcatnment, whether it be a full busi-
ness expense deduction or a capital loss.
40. 480 F.2d 1304. 1309 (7th Cir. 1973).
41. Id. at 1309 (citing Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner, 349 U.S. 237, 240 (1955): United
States v. Shirah, 253 F.2d 789, 800 (4th Cir. 1958)).
42. 60 T.C. 91, aff'd on rehearing, 61 T.C. 1 (1973), rev'd, 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
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MGM stock within the statutory period of six months. In January
1962 the Division of Corporate Finance of the Securities Exchange
Commission wrote a letter to MGM advising it that the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 required that any profit made by taxpayer as a
result of his short-swing stock dealings in the previous year be re-
ported in MGM's annual proxy statement.43 Immediately upon re-
ceiving this information MGM advised taxpayer of his probable lia-
bility of $53,870.81 to the corporation and of the requirement that this
liability be reported in the proxy statement. Taxpayer on the follow-
ing day satisfied the alleged liability and the proxy statement was
published without mention of it. Taxpayer never sought counsel, nor
was any determination of liability made.
The Tax Court refused to yield to the reversal of Aitchell, reiterat-
ing its contention that the sale of stock and the payment of alleged lia-
bility were not sufficiently intertwined to require application of the
Arrowsmith doctrine. It stated that taxpayer was acting in the capac-
ity of a stockholder as he sold the stock and in the capacity of a direc-
tor when he paid the liability. Furthermore, the Tax Court argued
that the payment was not made simply to satisfy the probable liabil-
ity, but primarily to prevent the alleged liability from being published
in the proxy statement to the injury of his business reputation; hence
the taxpayer did not have time to engage counsel to advise him of his
legal position before the publication of the proxy statement. The Tax
Court concluded that taxpayer's payment was for a business purpose
and thus was properly claimed as a business expense deduction.
Upon the reversal of the Tax Court's opinion in Anderson, the
Commissioner was granted a rehearing of Cummings." Since an ap-
peal of Cummings would go to the Second Circuit, the Tax Court was
not bound by either the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Mitchell or
that of the Seventh Circuit in Anderson. The Tax Court remained
unpersuaded by the arguments of the courts of appeals, and held
steadfast to its opinion that the sale and payment were not inextri-
cably intertwined and that the taxpayer was in the capacity of stock-
holder when he realized the gain and in the capacity of an insider
when he made the payment.
In response to the court of appeals' contention in Anderson
that the purpose of § 16(b) was relevant to the determination of the tax
treatment to be given the payment for alleged § 16(b) liability, the Tax
Court emphasized that in the instant case, as in Anderson, no deter-
mination of liability had been made. Payment was made promptly af-
ter the taxpayer learned that the alleged violation would be published
43. General Rules and Regulations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item 7(c) of
Schedule 14A, Information Required in Proxy Statement. 17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-101. Item 7e,
Instruction (4) (1976).
44. 61 T.C. 1 (1973), rev'd, 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
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in the MGM proxy statement to avoid embarrassing delay in the pub-
lication and to prevent the proliferation of the news through the busi-
ness community. Taxpayer had no time to engage counsel to deter-
mine his legal standing. The Tax Court maintained that the payment
was primarily for the protection of taxpayer's business reputation and
had little to do with the actual liability under § 16(b).
Six judges dissented in the Tax Court's rehearing of Cummings
for the same reasons given by Judge Dawson in his dissenting opinion
in Anderson. Again Judge Drennen suggested that the § 16(b) pay-
ment simply be added to the basis of the newly purchased stock.
Thus, the taxpayer would incur less capital gain upon the eventual
sale of the stock and consequently would pay less tax. Although ad-
mitting that this solution has no relevance to situations like Arrow-
smith and Skelly Oil, in which no subsequent purchase is involved,
he advocated that it be applied to the problem of characterizing pay-
ment for probable § 16(b) sale-purchase liability.
Undaunted by the Tax Court's refusal to change its characteri-
zation of the payments for possible § 16(b) liability, the Commissioner
again appealed. 45 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit deter-
mined that the sale of securities and the payment were sufficiently
linked to require application of the Arrowsmith doctrine. It also
found the Skelly Oil rationale of preventing tax windfalls relevant.
Additionally, the court considered the policy behind § 16(b)-"to
squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions within its pur-
view 46-and reasoned that it would frustrate the purpose of the secu-
rities law to allow an insider to profit from the prohibited short-swing
stock transaction by taxing the proceeds of his sale at the favorable
capital gain rate while allowing him to deduct at the higher ordinary
income rate. The court maintained that such an "anomalous result"
should be avoided.47
Cummings contended that the statutory policy behind § 16(b)
was not relevant to the court's determination of tax treatment be-
cause he had not been found officially liable under § 16(b) and had
some possible defenses to a § 16(b) action. 48 The court rejected this
contention by labeling his § 16(b) defenses "frivolous" and maintain-
ing that § 16(b) was designed for easy application and clear liability.
The court added that no proof of intent or knowledge of actual inside
information is necessary for liability under the provision.4 9  Cum-
45. Cummings v. Commissioner 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 013
(1975).
46. 506 F.2d at 452 (citing Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943)).
47. 506 F.2d at 452 (citing Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d at 1308, which in turn
cites United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969), and Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958)).
48. 506 F.2d at 452.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
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mings had contended that his liability was unclear based on relevant
precedent 0 and on the discretion allowed the MGM board in regard to
demanding repayment. The court answered that the authority cited
by Cummings was probably inapplicable to the ordinary sale-purchase
transaction and that, even assuming corporate reluctance to demand
repayment of the profit from the prohibited transaction, § 16(b) pro-
vides for a derivative suit by any stockholder of the issuing corpora-
tion. The court added that in a corporation such as MGM, whose
stock is so widely held, a derivative suit was almost inevitable. In
any event, the court refused to interpret the Code so as to subvert a
statutory scheme as lucid as § 16(b) simply because liability had not
been judicially declared. It reasoned that to allow a business expense
deduction for the payment to the corporation for obvious liability not
officially declared would offer an easy escape for the violator and ren-
der § 16(b) ineffective.
The majority specifically refused to determine the feasibility of
the alternative suggested by Judge Drennen of the Tax Court and one
commentator. 5 The court suggested that in some cases adding the re-
payment to the basis of the purchase price of the stock might better
effectuate the purpose of § 16(b). But it declined to address the issue
since neitther party urged adoption of this approach.
A concurring opinion filed by Judge Joseph Smith52 expressed
his view that Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil were not applicable to Cum-
mings. Judge Smith felt that both Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil dealt
with situations in which income previously received was expended in
satisfaction of a liability integrally connected with such previous in-
come. In Judge Smith's opinion this was simply not the situation
in Cummings, since a gain was made as a result of a sale of stock
and a payment was made in satisfaction of an apparent liability
resulting from a subsequent repurchase. He emphasized that the
§ 16(b) payment to MGM, which was calculated by subtracting from the
sale price the 1961 repurchase price, did not in any way represent a
-part of the prior income from the sale of MGM stock, which was
roughly the difference between the sales price and the 1954 purchase
price. He added that it is even possible to suffer a capital loss calcu-
lated from the original purchase and the sale while having a § 16(b)
profit as determined from the sale and subsequent purchase.5 3 Fur-
thermore, Judge Smith pointed out, the latter purchase has no tax
50. Brief of Appellee at 23 (citing Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp..
411 U.S. 582 (1973)).
51. Lokken, Tax Significance of Pavynents in Satisfaction of Liabilities Arising Under
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,4 GA. L REv. 298 (1970).
52. Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 449, 453 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
913 (1975).
53. See L. Loss, supra note 22, at 1063-64..
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significance until the newly purchased stock is sold. He concluded
that without the necessary connection between the § 16(b) payment
and the prior income, Arrowsmith could not apply. While conceding
that the majority's characterization of a repayment as part of a capital
gain would be appropriate to a purchase-sale violation of § 16(b), he
concluded that such a characterization in a sale-purchase situation
was inaccurate.
Judge Smith also questioned the relevance of precedent concern-
ing the dilution of punitive fines through tax law.5 4  He contended
that, as stated in Commissioner v. Tellier, the "public policy doctrine"
is applicable only in a "sharply limited and carefully defined cate-
gory" of cases.55  He reasoned that since § 16(b) was remedial rather
than punitive in nature,56 a doctrine aimed at avoiding the softening
of punitive sanctions through tax law was not relevant. Judge Smith
concluded by adopting the approach suggested by Judge Drennen of
the Tax Court"7 and Professor Lokken 58-that payment in satisfaction
of an apparent liability under § 16(b) should be treated as an addition
to the basis of the subsequently purchased stock.
D. Brown v. Commissioner
The latest skirmish concerning the characterization of a payment
in satisfaction of alleged § 16(b) liability is Brown v. Commissioner.9
Brown was vice president and treasurer of Western Nuclear, Inc.
(Western). Between January 6 and May 5, 1966, he sold 3,000 shares
of Western common stock, and in March of the same year bought
16,000 shares of the same stock, in apparent violation of § 16(b). Al-
though Brown was aware of § 16(b), he did not believe that the statute
applied to restricted stock options. In March 1968, a Western stock-
holder began a derivative suit against Western and Brown for the
"profits" made by Brown from his short-swing trading. When Brown
became aware of the suit, he consulted two attorneys affiliated with
Western who informed him that they could not represent or advise
him because they represented Western. The attorneys suggested that
he seek independent counsel. Brown decided that it would be im-
54. Eg. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
55. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966).
56. 506 F.2d at 454 (citing Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260. 266 (2d Cir.
1969); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959)). See SEC, REPowr ON PROPOSALS
FOR AMENDMENTS To THE SECURITIEs ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURrTiS ExcHIANGI: A
OF 1934, H.R. Doc. 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1941), quoted in Darrell, The Tav Treatment of
Payments under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 64 HARM. L. RLv. 80.
91 (1950).
57. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 170, 176 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970).
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971); Cummings v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 91, a/fd on rehearing,
61 T.C. 1, 14 (1973), rev'd, 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
58. Lokken, supra note 51.
59. 73,275 P-H Tax Ct. Mem., rev'd, 529 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1976).
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possible to contest the suit and continue in his position with Western,
and so he paid the corporation $37,795.52, the full amount of the al-
leged liability. On his 1966 tax return taxpayer reported capital gains
from his sales of stock during that year, and on an amended 1968 tax
return he claimed a business expense deduction for the payment to
Western, which the Commissioner disallowed.
The Tax Court, as expected, maintained its position that if the
taxpayer was in the trade or business of being a corporate executive
and made the payment to protect his employment and business repu-
tation, the payment was fully deductible as an ordinary and necessary
business expense. Despite the three previous reversals in the courts of
appeals, the Tax Court held for the taxpayer. Again the Commis-
60
sioner appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the Tax
Court's finding that the taxpayer's motivation in making the payments
was his fear that litigation would damage his business reputation.
But the court found this motivation irrelevant against the backdrop of
the tax benefit doctrine articulated in Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil.
A unanimous court determined that the nature of the payment and
the prior tax treatment of the proceeds from the sale of the Western
common stock were controlling in the characterization of the payment.
The court determined that the sale resulting in a capital gain was
closely linked with the payment of the alleged liability to Western
because of Brown's statement that he had sold the stock in order to
fund the subsequent repurchase. The court was not persuaded that
the payment and sale were separate, nor that the transactions were
made in different capacities.
The court of appeals was similarly unimpressed with Brown's
contention that he should be allowed a business expense deduction
because he had never been found liable under § 16(b). Brown felt that
the business purpose of the payment was controlling. But the court
concluded that the event that had triggered the payment was the de-
rivative suit, and that the payment was tied to the sale of the stock,
which had previously been given favorable capital gains treatment.
In light of the close relationship between the payment and sale, the
business purpose of the payment was made irrelevant by Arrowsmith
and Skelly Oil. Thus, the court of appeals held that the tax benefit
should be limited to a capital loss deduction.
III. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
A. The Public Policy Approach
In a leading article concerning the deductibility of payments for
alleged § 16(b) liability, Robert M. Nelson suggests an approach based
60. Brown v. Commissioner, 529 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1976).
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upon the policy of § 16(b).6 ' Nelson concludes that § 16(b) is designed
to deter insider trading by taking the § 16(b) "profit" from the insider.
He recognizes that § 16(b) simply destroys any economic incentive
for insider trading, and is not intended to be penal in nature.
62
Based upon the policy of § 16(b), Nelson offers a flexible system
designed so that the amount of the deduction would vary according to
the tax cost of the § 16(b) transaction. For example, if a taxpayer
engaged in a purchase-sale violation of § 16(b), he would have to pay
a capital gain tax and return his profit to the corporation. According
to Nelson's formula, the taxpayer should deduct an amount equal to
the capital gain tax for his § 16(b) liability payment. This system is de-
signed to eliminate tax law interference with § 16(b) and would apply
to all varieties of § 16(b) violations.63
Nelson's approach is conceptually sound, albeit difficult to operate.
Calculations of tax cost change with differing types of § 16(b) viola-
tions. Among the types that he considers are purchase-sale violations,
sale-purchase violations, "short sale"-purchase violations, "sale against
the box"-purchase violations and multiple purchase-sale transactions.
Nelson also considers the effect on calculation of § 16(b) payments made
in a year subsequent to the stock transactions when the taxpayer is
under a different tax bracket.64 He demonstrates his awareness of the
possible complexity of the calculation when he adds:
It is beyond the scope of this article to examine in detail all of the situ-
ations that might arise where special care must be taken to precisely
calculate the actual tax cost of an insider profit because the insider has
other short-term gains or losses, for [sic] long-term gains or losses. It
is sufficient to point out that in these situations very careful analysis is
required to insure that the amount allowed as a deduction will exactly
offset the actual tax cost to the insider.65
When Nelson's calculations result in zero tax cost, the deduction
is to be disallowed. The rationale for disallowing the deduction is to
preserve the public policy underlying § 16(b). 66 Prior to 1969, argu-
ments concerning public policy limitations on deductions were based on
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner67 as limited by Commis-
sioner v. Tellier8 and Commissioner v. Sullivan.69 These and other
cases developed a "common law" test of deductibility that focused
61. Nelson, Tax Deductibility of Insider Profit Repayments. Resolving An Apparent Con-
flict, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 330 (1973).
62. Id. at 341-43.
63. Id. at 340.
64. Id. at 343-54.
65. Id. at 354 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 346-47.
67. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
68. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
69. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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on the "severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting from the
allowance of the deduction., 70  However, a 1961 Revenue Ruling1
contended that deductions for liability payments would not frustrate
the nonpenal § 16(b).' 2 More importantly, the Tax Reform Act of
196973 added § 162(c), (f), and (g), which specifically list payments for
which § 162 deductions are to be denied on the basis of public policy.
The legislative history of the Act indicates that the statutory coverage
"is intended to be all inclusive" and that "[p]ublic policy, in other cir-
cumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify the
disallowance of deductions." 74  This probably is the death knell for
the "common law" of public policy in terms of § 162. 75 Nelson argues
that the lucid public policy of § 16(b) is the exception to the general
rule as stated in the Senate Report. Whether a court would agree
remains to be seen, but Nelson's approach is unlikely to gain wide
acceptance due to its great complexity.
B. Purchase-Sale Violations
The Arrowsmith doctrine stands for the proposition that when a
person is taxed at the favorable capital gain rate and later is forced to
surrender a portion of that gain, the deduction for that payment is
limited to a capital loss deduction. Arrowsmith prevents the tax
windfall that would result if the taxpayer were taxed at the limited
capital gain rate when he received the earnings but allowed a full de-
duction for relinquishing the same income. While there are no cases so
holding, Arrowsmith should clearly apply to a purchase-sale violation of
§ 16(b), since the § 16(b) payment is accurately characterized as part
of the prior capital gain.
One might argue, however, that Arrowsmith is inapplicable when
repayment to the issuing corporation occurs before official determination
of § 16(b) liability. A taxpayer could cite the Tax Court opinions in
Mitchell, Anderson, Cummings, and Brown in support of the con-
tention that his payment was made to protect his business reputation
rather than to satisfy any § 16(b) liability. Thus, the taxpayer would be
allowed a full business expense deduction. Judicial acceptance of such
an" argument in cases involving taxpayers with business reputations
would significantly narrow the application of Arrowsmith. A clever
taxpayer could escape the clutches of Arrowsmith by quickly satisfy-
ing his obvious § 16(b) liability before official determination, pur-
70. 356 U.S. at 35.
71. Rev. Rul. 61-115, 1961-1 C.B. 46.
72. See authorities cited in note 56 supra.
73. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
74. Senate Comm. on Finance, Tax Reform Act of.1969, S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 274 (1969).
75. But cf. Raymond MazzeL, 61 T.C. 497 (1974) (concerning § 165 of the Code).
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portedly in order to protect an endangered business reputation. Hence,
the taxpayer would have what Arrowsmith forbids-a gain taxed at the
favorable capital gain rate and a relinquishment of that gain deducti-
ble at the favorable ordinary income rate. Whether courts would allow
this remains to be seen, but it is highly unlikely given the judicial
adherence to Arrowsmith in the less appropriate area of a sale-
purchase violation. Although this blanket application of Arrowsnith
would sacrifice the good faith protector of a business reputation, such
a person would rarely be encountered since § 16(b) is designed for
easy application and clear liability. 6  In addition, the consistent ap-
plication of Arrowsmith to both clever and good faith taxpayers would
save the courts from making this very difficult determination of sub-
jective motivation. Thus, the nets of Arrowsmith would spread over the
sly taxpayer who simply pays his apparent liability early.
C. Sale-Purchase Violations
Arrowsmith's applicability to a sale-purchase violation of § 16(b)
is less clear. In a sale-purchase violation, the § 16(b) payment does
not represent a portion of the gain. The capital gain results from
the earlier purchase and sale, while the § 16(b) liability payment is
made because of the sale and later purchase. The sale completes a
capital gain transaction, while the later purchase begins a separate
capital transaction which itself has no tax significance until ultimate
sale. In a sale-purchase violation the sale results in income, and the
later purchase, which begins a separate transaction, results in § 16(b)
liability. Thus, the § 16(b) payment does not logically represent a por-
tion of the sale proceeds. As Judge Smith concluded in Cummings,
"the fact that one kind of violation of § 16(b) leads to Arrowsmith-
Skelly Oil treatment does not require that all kinds of violations of
§ 16(b) be so treated. ' "
The Tax Court agrees with Judge Smith. Its approach to a sale-
purchase violation of § 16(b) is to distinguish Arrowsmith and allow
the taxpayer a business expense deduction for the protection of his
business reputation. This approach weakens the deterrent effect of
§ 16(b).78 More importantly, the Tax Court approach leaves in doubt
the tax treatment to be given other insiders, that is, ten percent stock-
holders and low paid directors of corporations. These insiders may
lack a "trade or business" in that capacity under § 162 of the Code.7"T
76. See Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d at 452-53.
77. Cummings v. Commissioner, 506 F.2d 449, 454 (2d Cir. 1974).
78. This is probably no longer a valid criticism in light of § 162(c). (0. and (g) of the Code
and the accompanying legislative history. See notes 74 & 75 supra and accompanying text,
79. I.R.C. § 162(a). See Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S, 212 (1941) But c1: Cum-
mings v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 91, affd on rehearing, 61 T.C. 1 (1973), revd. 506 F.2d 449
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975) (Tax Court allowed a business expense dedue-
tion to a director).
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But perhaps the strongest criticism of the Tax Court approach is that
it treats similar § 16(b) violators differently: while Arrowsmith limits
the deductibility of the purchase-sale violator's payment, the sale-
purchase violator's payment is fully deductible. A sale-purchase and
purchase-sale are simply two different ways of violating § 16(b); the
sale-purchase violator deserves no better tax treatment than the pur-
chase-sale violator.
Judge Drennen's characterization of the sale-purchase violator's
payment nearly eliminates this unwarranted discrimination. His ap-
proach is to add the amount of the § 16(b) payment to the basis of the
newly acquired stock. This treatment is similar to that given expenses
incurred in defense of title to property.80 The payment, which is not
immediately deductible, is added to the basis, thereby delaying the
tax benefit until sale or exchange of the stock. The taxpayer benefits
by the decrease in capital gain or increase in capital loss caused by
the addition to basis. This does not insure precisely equal tax treat-
ment of purchase-sale and sale-purchase violators because the capital
gain or loss tax rate in the year of payment may be different than in
the year of ultimate sale or exchange. 81  Also, the sale-purchase vio-
lator's tax benefit is delayed while the purchase-sale violator receives
an immediate deduction. But the possible difference in tax dollars
owed is minimal compared to the Tax Court approach of allowing the
sale-purchase violator a full business expense deduction for the
§ 16(b) payment. Drennen's approach affords different treatment to
§ 16(b) violators because of the "unavoidable consequences of the
annual accounting system."82 Additionally, Drennen's approach does
treat insiders alike. It is immaterial whether the § 16(b) violator has a
"trade or business."
But the most appealing aspect of Judge Drennen's approach is
that it accurately characterizes the § 16(b) payment in a sale-purchase
situation. Unlike the Arrowsmith approach, his addition-to-basis ap-
proach recognizes that the § 16(b) payment is more logically linked to
the subsequent purchase than to the prior purchase and sale. Like the
Arrowsmith approach, it renders the business purpose for the payment
irrelevant, and limits the deductibility of the expenditure. The Arrow-
smith doctrine should apply to purchase-sale violations; however, the
courts of appeals, in apparent attempts at uniform treatment of § 16(b)
payments, have overextended Arrowsmith in applying the doctrine to
sale-purchase violations of § 16(b). Drennen's addition-to-basis treat-
ment accurately conceptualizes the § 16(b) payment in the case of a sale-
purchase violation.
80. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(c).
81. See I.R.C. §§ 1201 and 1202.
82. But see I.R.C. § 1341; Lokken, supra note 51, at 315-320.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If Arrowsmith is to remain an efficacious doctrine, it must limit
the deductibility of payments made in satisfaction of obvious § 16(b)
liability for purchase-sale violations. Moreover, if a taxpayer can side-
step the Arrowsmith doctrine by simply paying his obvious liability
before official determination and claiming that the payment was made
to salvage an endangered business reputation, then the doctrine's
applicability will be severely limited.
In a sale-purchase violation of § 16(b) the applicability of Arrow-
smith is doubtful. It is difficult to conceptualize the integral relation
required by the Arrowsmith doctrine between the § 16(b) payment and
the capital gain from the prior purchase and sale. The liability arises
solely because the taxpayer repurchases stock within six months of
the sale.
Public policy considerations should not limit deductibility in lieu
of Arrowsmith. Limiting the deduction of a sale-purchase violator
based on the judicially established "frustration of policy" doctrine?-
is contrary to congressional intentions as manifested by § 162(c), (f),
and (g) of the Code8 4 and the accompanying legislative history.8 '
Congress could decisively eradicate the problem by adopting Code
provisions prohibiting deductions, business or otherwise, for apparent
and actual § 16(b) payments. This would provide consistent tax
treatment of all § 16(b) violators and make Arrowsmith inapplicable.
It would preserve Arrowsmith from the crippling effect of the Tax
Court approach and the inaccurate application of the courts of ap-
peals. Although this approach would punish the § 16(b) violator to an
extent not originally anticipated, 6 the benefit of consistency seems
well worth it.
Absent such legislation, the courts must choose among three
alternative approaches for sale-purchase violations of § 16(b): the Tax
Court's approach, that of the courts of appeals, or that articulated by
Judge Drennen. The Tax Court unfairly favors the sale-purchase vio-
lator with a business reputation to protect. The courts of appeals' ap-
proach distorts and stretches the Arrowsmith doctrine in an attempt at
uniform tax treatment of all § 16(b) payments. Drennen's approach is
conceptually sound and equitable in its treatment of all § 16(b) viola-
tors. Although apparently inconsistent, in that the Arrowsmith doe-
83. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1963); Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S.
687 (1958); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
84. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
85. Senate Comm. on Finance, Tax Reform Act of 1969, S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. 274 (1969).
86. See SEC REPORT, supra note 56. See also Feder v. Martin-Marietta Corp,. 406
F.2d 260, 266 (2d Cir. 1969); Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959).
[Vol. 38:105
1977] TAXATION OF 16(b) PA YMENTS 123
trine would apply to purchase-sale violations and Drennen's treatment
to sale-purchase violations, both approaches produce similar results.
Moreover, Drennen's approach logically links the § 16(b) payment with
the repurchase in a sale-purchase violation. Thus, Judge Drennen's
solution is preferable.
Michael E Grove

